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INTRODUCTION
aviation

programs (VDPs) in
DISCLOSURE
are a rich source
of safety-related data that are only obtainaVOLUNTARY
ble from front-line users of the national airspace system. Confidentiality and the absence of retribution are critical
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components of effective VDPs, such as Flight Operations Quality
Assurance (FOQA) and the Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP). Consequently, if regulatory agencies wish to continue
to receive this information (and the substantial safety-related
gains resulting from this information), these programs must be
encouraged, not stifled. The information derived from such
programs must be used primarily for safety purposes, and the
front-line users (typically employees of a commercial enterprise)
reporting such information must have their confidentiality reasonably protected.
However, despite the fact that industry stakeholders, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), view the unfettered flow of
information from employee reports as integral to producing future improvements in aviation safety, VDPs, in particular the
ASAP, are being threatened by attempts to discover the voluntarily disclosed information during civil litigation.' Two decisions
on this matter, arising out of two fatal crashes, reached diametrically opposed conclusions on whether ASAP information is entitled to a limited qualified privilege.2 A federal statute
protecting this information, similar to the protection given to
cockpit voice recorders, is the only way to bring finality to this
issue and avoid expensive and incredibly time-consuming, caseby-case, jurisdiction-byjurisdiction examination and resolution
of this issue.
II. HISTORY
The need for a voluntary reporting system was identified as
necessary to reduce civil aviation accident rates as early as 1958.1
Despite this, voluntary reporting of events adverse to flight safety
by front-line operators in the National Airspace System (NAS),
such as flight crew, dispatchers, mechanics, and air traffic controllers, was virtually non-existent until 1975 when the Aviation
I See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lexington, KY., Aug. 27, 2006, 545 F. Supp. 2d 618,
619-20 (E.D. Ky. 2008); In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06CV-316-KSF, 2008 WL 170528, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2008); Tice v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 271-72 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia
on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F. Supp. 1529, 1530-31 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
2 Compare Lexington, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (holding no privilege applies to
ASAP reports), with Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1537 (applying privilege to ASAP
reports).
3 NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,

ASRS

7 (2007),
[hereinafter NASA

PROGRAM BRIEFING

http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/ASRSProgramBriefing08.ppt
ASRS].

2010]

THE ARGUMENT FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION

163

Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was modified with provisions
safeguarding the confidentiality of the reporting party and conferring qualified immunity.' These provisions were specifically
included, as it was believed that compromising confidentiality,
or using an ASRS report in punitive action against the reporting
party, would detrimentally affect "the free, unrestricted flow of
information from the users of the NAS."5 These safeguards
preventing such disclosure have made the ASRS a resounding
success (in its modified condition), collecting over 700,000 incident reports in its first 30 years of operation.6
Major airlines also recognized the benefit of voluntarily submitted information to improve line safety, leading many airlines,
unions, and the FAA to jointly establish ASAP. 7 ASAP is similar
to the ASRS program in that it also solicits voluntarily submitted
safety information from front-line users of the NAS.8 The FAA
4

See

FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM ADVISORY

No. 00-46D 1 3 (1997), http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatoryand-Guidance
Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%2000-46D/$FILE/AC00-46D.pdf [hereinafter ASRP]. The original ASRS, started earlier in 1975, was a standalone project administered entirely by the FAA. See id. Users of the NAS were concerned
with giving the FAA, the administrative agency responsible for certificate action
through administrative enforcement of Federal Aviation Regulation violations,
the data that showed such violations happened, but they were assured that the
reports and information would only be used for safety purposes. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., AVIATION SAFETY AcTION PROGRAM (ASA-P), ADVISORY CIRCULAR No.
120-66B 2 (2002), http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory-and GuidanceLibrary/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%20120-66B/$FILE/AC120-66B.pdf
[hereinafter AC
120-66B]. The FAA concurred that users would only submit meaningful information if another party collected the information. See ASRP,
3. Consequently,
NASA was given the responsibilities outlined in AC 00-46D. Id.
5 ASRP, supra note 4, 1 1. See also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DESIGNATION OF AVIATION SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM (ASAP) INFORMATION AS PROTECTED FROM PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE UNDER 14 CFR PART 193, ORDER 8000.82 1 3 (2003), http://www.
airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory-andGuidanceLibrary/rgOrders.nsf/0/3BEDE9F5
973E6DFA86256D9BOO5790CB?OpenDocument [hereinafter ASAP ORDER] (explaining that "safety and security information is protected from disclosure in order to encourage persons to provide the information to the Federal Aviation
Administration").
6 NASA ASRS, supra note 3, at 13.
7 See Robert L. Sumwalt, III, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety
Board, Keynote Address at the 30th Anniversary Celebration of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (Nov. 10, 2006), http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/
sumwalt/rls061 1 10.htm [hereinafter Sumwalt Address] (explaining that the ability of voluntarily submitted safety programs to improve safety issues was proved by
USAir's Altitude Awareness Program, which showed a nearly 70% decrease in
altitude deviations when awareness of the issue was brought to the attention of
line pilots).
8 AC 120-66B, supra note 4, 1 3.
CIRCULAR
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has acknowledged that if users are given incentives, such as qualified immunity from administrative action and a guarantee that
their employer will not use voluntarily disclosed information for
disciplinary purposes, meaningful safety-related information will
be disclosed and needed safety improvements made.9 However,
if such information is publicly disclosed and used outside the
safety context, it will have a chilling effect on receipt of future
data and will be detrimental to the FAA mandate of promoting
aviation safety.10
VDPs are of increasing importance in today's environment,
ironically, exactly because the aviation industry has such an incredible safety history. As reported by the blue ribbon panel
appointed May 1, 2008, by then Secretary of Transportation
Mary E. Peters to examine the FAA's safety culture and approach to safety management:
In commercial aviation, the strategy of problem-identificationthrough-analysis-of-accident-data has just about reached its
limits....
Given these significant advances, almost every accident that happens now is unique. Moreover, exhaustive investigation and
analysis of each accident leads inexorably to yet more safety enhancements, mandated across the industry, designed to reduce
the risk of that accident happening again. The forensic approach
has been pushed to its limits.
. . .Just like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (which works
to prevent catastrophic failure of nuclear power plants), or intelligence and security agencies seeking to protect us from major
terrorist attacks, nearly all of the FAA's work now belongs in the
realm of precursors to an accident, and precursors to the precursors. As accidents become more rare, the work of accident prevention moves further and further back in the unfolding
chronology of the risk, identifying contributory factors, and potential contributors, long before they manifest themselves in a
disaster."

9 Id.
10

ASAP ORDER, supra note

5, 916(c).

RIBBON PANEL APPOINTED MAY 1, 2008 BY SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION, MARY E. PETERS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM, MANAGING
RISKS IN CIVIL AVIATION: A REVIEW OF THE FAA's APPROACH TO SAFETY 19-20

11BLUE

(2008), http://www.aci-na.org/static/entransit/irt-faasafety_9-08.pdf
ter

IRT

REPORT].

[hereinaf-
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TYPES OF AVIATION DISCLOSURE PROGRAMS

The FAA is involved in numerous VDPs, the most prominent
ones being FOQA, ASAP, and the VDRP programs. These programs were described in the IRT Report as follows:
* Fight Operations Quality Assurance- FOQA collects and
makes available for analysis digital flight data generated
during normal operations. It provides objective data not
available through other methods, supporting analysis and
enhancement of operational procedures, flight paths, air
traffic control procedures, maintenance, engineering, and
training. The final FOQA rule, issued in 2001, codifies
protections for airlines from the use of FOQA data for enforcement purposes, except where criminal or deliberate
acts are involved. Only redacted versions of the data (deidentified and aggregated) are reviewed for operational
trends.
* Aviation Safety Action Program: This program encourages industry employees to report safety information that may be
critical in identifying potential precursors to accidents.
Safety issues are normally resolved through corrective action rather than through punishment or discipline. ASAP
reports are discussed, and corrective actions formulated,
by an Event Review Committee (ERC), which typically comprises representatives from the company, the employees'
union (when applicable), and the FAA.
* Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP): This program encourages regulated entities themselves (e.g., airlines, repair stations, etc.) to voluntarily report instances of
regulatory non-compliance. This enables the FAA to participate in root-cause analysis of events leading up to violations, and to propose and monitor corrective actions. 12
In particular, an ASAP program is formed when an air carrier,
the FAA, and the air carrier's affected employees or the labor
union representing such employees sign a tripartite memorandum of understanding (MOU) which sets out the framework of
the program." The main advantage of ASAP over ASRS is that
carrier-specific incidents are reviewed, the parties are educated,
Id. at 30.
See AC 120-66B, supra note 4, at 13-16, app. 1 at 1-8. See also FED. AVIATION
ADMIN., AVIATION SAFErY ACTION PROGRAMS (ASAP), ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 12066, 1 9, app. 1 11 1-15 (1997), http://rgl.faa.gov/RegulatoryandGuidance
Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/list/AC%20120-66/$FILE/AC120-66.pdf.
12
13
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and corrective action is taken quickly, whereas the ASRS is a "big
picture" diagnostic tool and not as proactive at addressing single
carrier issues."
Air carriers and the FAA realize that the type of information
received in an ASAP report, typically sole-source operational errors and inadvertent violations of Federal Aviation Regulations,
can only be obtained with employee cooperation, and without it
a valuable source of data would be non-existent.' 5 As noted by
the IRT Report, with respect to VDPs: "At this stage in the evolution of aviation safety, voluntary disclosures, and the pool of information they generate, are critically important. Without
them, safety analysis (which is the only sure basis for future
safety enhancements) would have very little reliable data to work
on."16
However, the ASAP program is different from other similarly
established voluntary reporting programs across a number of
other major federal agencies in two significant ways: (1) "ASAP
reports are prompted by any kind of safety concern," not only
those involving a violation of a regulation; and (2) the majority
of the other federal programs "focus on disclosure by companies,
rather than by individuals."" Hence, "the disclosure primarily
affects the likelihood. .. of enforcement action against the regulated commercial entity itself, rather than its . . . employees.""

14

See generally AC 120-66B, supra note 4; NASA ASRS, supra note 3.

15 See NASA ASRS, supra note 3, at 4-5 (noting that the program collects "voluntarily submitted" information to address the concern of "human performance

in the aviation system"); HearingBefore S. Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety

and Security, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement ofJohn O'Brien, Member of Executive Comm., Flight Safety Foundation) http://www.senate.gov (search for John
O'Brien) [hereinafter O'Brien Statement] ("the quality of the data gathered is
only as good as the assurances for the operators and the operator's employees
that the data will be used to improve safety, not to facilitate prosecution or
discipline.").
16 IRT REPORT, supra note 11, at 21.
17 Id. at 31.
is Id. "The EPA, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), IRS, Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) all operate voluntary disclosure programs." Id.

2010]
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CALI V. LEXINGTON
A.

OVERVIEW

Parties have sought discovery of voluntarily disclosed safety information resulting from ASAP reports in civil actions in two
instances resulting from fatal aviation accidents." The first, In
re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on December 20, 1995, was a case in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (part
of the Eleventh Circuit), in which plaintiffs sought discovery of
American Airlines' ASAP data to prove negligence on the part
of the air carrier.2 0 In this case, the court denied discovery of
ASAP data based on a limited common law privilege arising out
of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."
In In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006, the
plaintiffs again sought to prove negligence of the air carrier
through discovery of Comair's ASAP data.2 2 In this case, the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky (part of
the Sixth Circuit) refused to uphold the common law privilege
relied on in Cali and allowed discovery of the information. As
a result, the confidentiality afforded voluntarily disclosed safety
information, as well as the continued viability of ASAP programs, has been put into question.
B.

ESSENTIAL ARGUMENTS

American Airlines, and later Comair, asserted the following in
an attempt to keep ASAP reports protected from discovery: (1)
the self-critical analysis privilege; and (2) a limited common law
privilege based on the Federal Rules of Evidence, which was recognized in Cali.24 Comair further claimed disclosure of ASAP
reports was contradictory to congressional intent and prohibited
by statute, and asserted that the Plaintiffs' Steering Committee
(PSC) was required to show a substantial need for the ASAP re19 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 545 F. Supp. 2d 618, 619
(E.D. Ky. 2008); In re Air Crash Near Cali, Colombia on Dec. 20, 1995, 959 F.
Supp. 1529, 1530 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
20 Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1530.
21 Id. at 1533, 1535; Comair's Mem. of Law in Supp. of its Mot. for a Protective
Order against Disclosure of Comair's Aviation Safety Action Program Reports
and Mot. to Quash Pls.' Rule 30(b) (6) Notice of Dep., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF 2006 WL 5152923 (E.D. Ky. 2006)
[hereinafter Comair Memorandum].
22 Lexington, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
23 Id. at 624.
24

Id. at 619; Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1532-33.
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ports.2 5 Comair argued that public disclosure of ASAP information would be contrary to the intent of Congress, which
recognized that parties would be unlikely to share information if
it was to be released publicly "'because it could be easily misinterpreted, misunderstood, or misapplied.'" 2
In Cali, Judge Marcus rejected the self-critical analysis privilege but agreed that a limited common law privilege was applicaThe judge
ble and denied discovery of the information.
concluded, inter alia, that ASAP materials were entitled to a limited common law privilege based on the psychotherapist-patient
common law privilege articulated in Jaffee v. Redmond.28 The
court used the framework from Jaffee to create a balancing test
weighing the public need for the privilege versus the cost to the
individual plaintiff by considering: (1) the private interests of
Comair Memorandum, supra note 21.
Comair Memorandum, supra note 21 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-714(I), at
40 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3658, 3677). Specifically, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40123(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, nor any agency receiving information from the Administrator, shall disclose voluntarilyprovided safety or security related information if the Administrator
finds that(1) the disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information and that the receipt of
that type of information aids in fulfilling the Administrator's
safety and security responsibilities; and
(2) withholding such information from disclosure would be
consistent with the Administrator's safety and security
responsibilities.
25

26

49 U.S.C. § 40123(a) (2006).
27 Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1532, 1535.
28 See Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1533 (discussing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1
(1996) as providing a useful framework for analyzing American Airlines' claim of
an applicable common law privilege based on Federal Rule of Evidence 501).
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
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"whether dissemination of . .. information will chill the 'frank

and complete disclosure of facts' shared;" (2) "the 'public interests' furthered by the proposed privilege;" (3) "the 'likely evidentiary benefit ...

from . .. den [ying] .. . the privilege;"' and

(4) "the extent to which the privilege has been recognized by
state courts and legislatures."2
In reviewing these issues, the Cali court observed as follows:
o That discovery of reports would adversely affect private interests by "chill [ing] the 'frank and complete disclosure of
facts' shared in an 'atmosphere of confidence and
trust.'

"30

The PSC had conceded and the court held that there was
"a powerful and compelling public interest in improving"
aviation safety.3 1
o American Airlines' claim was correct (as were amici briefs
filed by the Flight Safety Foundation and the Air Line Pilots Association) in that a powerful chilling effect on pilot
reporting would result from denial of the privilege. 2
The court also rejected the PSC's argument that there would
be no deterring effect in allowing discovery of the ASAP information and held that: (1) a protective order was not sufficient to
protect confidentiality; and (2) discovery of "pilot errors that go
beyond the inadvertent or incidental are" recorded by other
parties elsewhere so that pilots would not be able to hide behind
the ASAP cloak of confidentiality to thwart discovery.
Finally, although no state or federal court or legislature had
recognized the limited common law privilege applicable to
ASAP reports, Judge Marcus ruled that the value of confidential
reporting programs and the need for absolute confidentiality
had been supported by other courts, for example, the self-critical analysis privilege.3 4
Over a decade later, the discoverability of ASAP data was reviewed again. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky adopted the opinion and order of Magistrate Judge
Todd (Todd Opinion) which soundly rejected the arguments
o

29
30
31
3
33
34

Cali, 959 F. Supp. at 1533 (quotingJaffee, 518 U.S. at 10-13).
Id. at 1533, 1535 (quotingJaffee, 518 U.S. at 10).
Id. at 1534-35, 1537.
Id. at 1534.
Id. at 1534-35.
Id. at 1535.
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raised by Comair and the precedent set in Cali and allowed discovery of the ASAP information.
In the Todd Opinion, Magistrate Todd ruled as follows:
* Congress did not expressly create a privilege for ASAP programs, and legislative history indicates that Congress only
intended to preclude release of ASAP reports to the general public pursuant to Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests; 36
* Disclosure of ASAP information was contemplated by the
FAA, as the FAA had agreed to produce the reports pursuant to a court order.
* Congress previously had expressly excluded items such as
cockpit voice recorder transcripts from discovery in the
past, but had refused to do so for voluntarily disclosed
safety information.
* No privilege attached to the information either under the
self-critical analysis privilege or a common law privilege as:
(1) ASAP reports were sent to third parties and are not
held in strict confidence either by the commercial entity
doing the reporting or the FAA; and (2) FAA regulations
expressly authorize disclosure of ASAP information pursuant to a court order.3 9
Additionally, Magistrate Todd found that discovery of the
ASAP data would not create a chilling effect that would discourage such reports, noting: (1) "the 'many incentives' to conduct
safety reviews outweigh any harm from disclosure;" (2) the gains
5 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 545 F. Supp. 2d 618, 620
(E.D. Ky. 2008); In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316KSF, 2008 WL 170528, at *8, *10 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2008).
36 Lexington, 2008 WL 170528, at *5-6.
7 Id. at *2.
38 See id. at *5-6 (referencing Congress's prohibition of discovery of cockpit
voice recorder transcripts pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (2006); Pls.' Resp. in
Opp'n to Comair's Mot. for a Protective Order Against Disclosure of Comair's
Aviation Safety Action Program Reports and Mot. to Quash Pls.' Rule 30(b) (6)
Notice of Dep., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316KSF, 2008 WL 170528, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2008) ("If Congress had intended
that ASAP Reports not be discoverable, Congress knew how to write that privilege
in; it did not. Instead, it specifically provided that the FAA could be ordered to
disclose ASAP reports by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
3 Lexington, 2008 WL 170528, at *8-9. The court further interpreted 14 C.F.R.
§§ 193.7(f) and 193.9 as requiring the FAA to disclose ASAP reports to (1) correct a continually uncorrected safety condition, (2) in a criminal prosecution,
and (3) "when ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction", which the
FAA did not dispute. Id. at *6 (internal quotations omitted).
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in safety that result from internal review remain an attractive
incentive in itself; and (3) the financial benefit of deterring further lawsuits through review remains important.4 0 Finally, and
importantly, Magistrate Todd observed that the policy arguments made by Comair and others were in the wrong forum and
should be more appropriately addressed to Congress and the
FAA.41
In the wake of the Todd Opinion decisions, airline general
counsel can reasonably conclude that ASAP reports incur legal
liability and will advise the airline to consider this when asked to
participate in or continue an ASAP program. Hence, it is likely
that an air carrier would curtail pure internal review and leave a
greater part of the field investigation to the NTSB to offset any
increased liabilities. Additionally, airline pilots, mechanics, and
flight attendants who participate in an ASAP program must also
conclude that confidentiality of these reports can be breached
in a negligence action against them personally and question
whether a more prudent decision is to report under ASRS and
forgo ASAP protection.
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR STATUTORY PROTECTION
Voluntarily reported safety information has led to great gains
in aviation safety, but these gains will only continue as long as
these programs are credible and front-line operators are assured
that their identities are kept confidential and that their information will only be used to improve aviation safety. As a result, it is
in the best interests of industry stakeholders (air carriers and
unions), participants (employees and air traffic controllers), industry regulators (the FAA), and the flying public to continue to
receive ASAP data and its associated gains in safety.4 2
Support for the ASAP programs from airline employees is eroding due to conflicts between management and unions and
the lack of protection for the confidentiality of this information
- Id. at *9 (quoting Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th
Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added).
41 See id. at *7 ("The balancing of conflicting interests of this type is particularly
a legislative function.").
42 The importance of such programs has recently been reinforced by Congress. See Airline Safety and Pilot Training Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 3371,
111th Cong. § 14 (2009) (addressing further implementation of ASAP programs). In the proposed legislation, Congress specifically directs the FAA to develop a plan to facilitate the establishment of ASAP and FOQA programs by all
Part 121 air carriers. Id.
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perceived by both unions and airlines.4" Therefore, unless Congress takes action to protect this information, aviation safety
stands in real jeopardy of losing a safety tool considered to be
invaluable by most experts that have reviewed the subject.
Congress knows well how to take protective measures. In
1964, the FAA required airlines to install cockpit voice recorders
(CVRs) in large airplanes, and it noted that CVRs "would be a
valuable tool in the investigation of accidents by providing firsthand information of the flight crews' observation and analysis."4 4 The FAA further observed:
The Agency agrees that its only purpose in requiring the recorded information is to assist in determining the cause of accidents or occurrences, and that the information should be used
only in connection with the investigation of accidents or occurrences . . . and not in any civil penalty or certificate action ....

The Agency cannot, of course, bind the Courts or the Civil Aeronautics Board with respect to accident information ....
However, as one author has noted, "[w]ith the enactment of
the FOIA and increased interest on the part of the media, the
floodgates were opened." 46 CVR transcription excerpts and
tapes found their way into the media and the courtrooms.4 7
Given the disclosures, Congress not once, but twice, passed legislation restricting the use and dissemination of CVR information
and tapes so that they would be used as originally intended, in
accident investigations. 4 8 Congress passed such protective measures while still ensuring that the public and the judicial system
had access to information that was needed.4 9
The current restrictions on use of CVRs are found at Title 49
U.S.C. § 1154(a)."o Subject only to certain exceptions that allow
See, e.g., Trebor Banstetter, American, Pilots Agree to Renew Key Safety Program,
Mar. 26, 2009 (describing negotiated agreement
between American Airlines and its pilots regarding ASAP program).
44 Installation of Cockpit Voice Recorders in Large Airplanes Used by an Air
Carrier or a Commercial Operator, 29 Fed. Reg. 8401 (Fed. Aviation AgencyJuly
3, 1964) [hereinafter Installation of CVRs].
45 Id.
46 Van Stewart, "Privileged Communications?" The Bright Line Rule in the Use of
Cockpit Voice Recorder Tapes, 11 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 389, 395 (2003).
47 Id.
- See Act to Extend the Aviation Insurance Program for Five Years, Pub. L. No.
97-309, 96 Stat. 1453, 1453 (1982) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1114(c) (2006); Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-641, 104 Stat.
4654, 4654 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1154 (2006)).
4
See id.
50 49 U.S. C. § 1154(a) states:
4

FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
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a court to admit the actual CVR in order to ensure a fair trial,
Congress has generally prohibited any use by a party in ajudicial
proceeding of any part of a transcript of a CVR that the NTSB
has not made available to the public, as well as the actual cockpit
recorder recording.51 If a court decides that either the non-public portions of the transcript or the actual CVR recording is required, such items can only be used pursuant to a protective
order issued by the court, as specified in the statute.
Protection of voluntarily disclosed safety information by pilots, flight attendants, or mechanics is consistent with the protection offered to CVRs and other safety-related information
within the aviation industry, such as NTSB Blue Cover reports."
By establishing such a protection, the plaintiffs' bar will not be
unduly hindered in its discovery of relevant information in civil
cases, any more than it has been unduly hindered given the protection accorded cockpit voice recorders. Although ASAP-type
data can only be received from front-line operators, ASAP is not
the only source of such information." As an example, operations at a certain airport can be sorted for subject matter and
researched through the ASRS.5 5 It is a common practice for air
carrier captains and first officers to file both an ASAP and ASRS
report on the same occurrence. 6 The difference between the
reports is that ASRS reports do not list the air carrier and are deidentified by NASA prior to entry into the ASRS database." Additionally, such information can be solicited through the use of
(a) Transcripts and Recordings-(1) Except as provided by this
subsection, a party in ajudicial proceeding may not use discovery to
obtain(A) any part of a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder transcript
that the National Transportation Safety Board has not made available to the public under section 1114(c) or 1114(d) of this title; and
(B) a cockpit or surface vehicle recorder recording.

49 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2006).
Id.
Id.
53 See 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (prohibiting the admission into evidence or the use
of any part of a Board report related to accidents or investigations).
54 See, e.g., NASA ASRS, supra note 3, at 4 (describing the source and content of
51

52

ASRS reports).

See id. at 27-32 (detailing "database search requests").
See FLIGHT SAFETY INFORMATION JOURNAL, REPORTING METHODS: ASRS/ASAP
5 (Third Quarter 2003), http://www.fsinfo.org/docs/FSI03Q3.pdf (explaining
the advisability of filing both ASAP and ASRS reports).
57 NASA ASRS, supra note 3, at 18; NASA, Aviation Safety Reporting System,
Confidentiality and Incentives to Report, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/confidentiality.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
55

56
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normal discovery, for example, interrogatories, depositions of
current and former employees, and, of course, the production
of emails.
Thus, Congress could also use a similar method to protect
ASAP information. A new statute requiring such protection
should specifically include in the purpose statement and comment section to the final rule in the Federal Register an explanation that the purpose of the legislation is to provide a
qualified and reasonable protection of voluntarily submitted aviation safety data from discovery in civil cases.
VI.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

As noted above, the existing legislation" and its implementing regulations 59 with respect to VDPs have not been uniformly
successful in withstanding the discovery onslaught in civil litigation."o Therefore, a legislative solution that mirrors the current
restriction on the use of CVRs found at 49 U.S.C. § 1154(a)
should be implemented.'
Since § 1154 is appropriately located in Chapter 11 of Title
49, which concerns the NTSB, it should not be disturbed. The
new language should quite naturally be included in Chapter 401
of Title 49 as VDPs are data submitted to the FAA. Hence, 49
U.S.C. § 40123 becomes the logical candidate to contain the
restrictions. 2
The preamble to the proposed legislation should explain that
the purpose of the legislation is to provide a qualified exception
from discovery of data obtained by the FAA through ASAP
VDPs, similar to the protection accorded the use of CVRs. Such
protection is necessary in that safety programs are only as successful as the government can assure the regulated entities that
the data submitted will indeed be used to enhance safety, and
not to exacerbate their position in damage suits. As with the
49 U.S.C. § 40123.
59 14 C.F.R. Part 193 (2009).
6o See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, 545 F. Supp. 2d 618,
624 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (failing to apply common law privilege to ASAP reports).
61 This is also the position of the Flight Safety Foundation. See O'Brien
Statement, supra note 15 ("The Foundation has called for the creation of a legislative
'qualified exception' form discovery of voluntary self-disclosure reporting programs, similar to that provided in U.S. law against discovery and use of cockpit
and surface vehicle recordings and transcripts.").
62 49 U.S.C. § 40115, which deals with withholding information from the public, but not the Congress or the judicial system, would remain unchanged. See 49
U.S.C. § 40115.
58
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CVR, there needs to be an absolute statutory exception to ensure that safety investigative tools and analyses are used solely to
prevent accidents and not to influence courts or juries in private
litigation. To do otherwise only diminishes or destroys the incentives for submitting such data, which is not in the public
interest."
As an example, § 40123 could be amended to read as follows:
(a) IN GENERAL(1) Except as provided by this subsection, a party in a judicial
proceeding may not use discovery to obtain any part of safety
or security information or data, submitted, collected, or contained in any form, electronic or otherwise, from any Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program designated by the Federal
Aviation Administration that has not been made available to
the public under section 40115 of this title.
(2) (A) Except as provided in paragraphs (3) (A) or (3) (B) of
this subsection, a court may allow discovery by a party of data
from a Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program if, after an in
camera review, the court decides that-(i) the part of the data
made available to the public under section 40115 of this title
does not provide the party with sufficient information for the
party to receive a fair trial; and (ii) discovery of additional
parts of the data is necessary to provide the party with sufficient information for the party to receive a fair trial. (B) A
court may allow discovery, or require production for an in
camera review, of data that the Administrator has not made
available under section 40115 of this title only if the original
Voluntary Disclosure Report is not available.
(3) (A) When a court allows discovery in ajudicial proceeding
of a part of data from a Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program not made available to the public under section 40115 of
this title, the court shall issue a protective order-(i) to limit
the use of the part of the data to the judicial proceeding; and
(ii) to prohibit dissemination of the part of the data to any
63 As the FAA Administrator recently emphasized, "history has shown that we
implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when we work
together to find solutions to the challenges we face in today's aviation environment." Letter from J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator, FAA, to Airline Unions
(June 24, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/media/Letter toUnions_
062309.pdf. See also One Year After the Crash of Flight 3407: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Aviation Operations, Safety and Security on Aviation Safety, 111th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Peggy Gillian, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration), available at http://www.faa.gov/news/testimony/news story.cfm?newsId=1 1191.
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person that does not need access to the part of the data for
the proceeding.
(B) A court may allow a part of the data not made available to
the public under section 40115 of this title to be admitted
into evidence in a judicial proceeding only if the court places
such data under seal to prevent the use of such data for purposes other than for the proceeding.
(4) This subsection does not prevent the Administrator from
referring at any time to any data from a Voluntary Disclosure
Reporting Program in promulgating any safety regulations.
(b) REGULATIONS-The Administrator shall issue regulations to carry out this section.
Thereafter, Federal Aviation Regulation 193 should be
amended to designate which VDPs are to be protected by the
new legislation and to make such additional changes as are necessary to conform the regulations to the new legislation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Voluntarily disclosed safety information is a rich source of
data that is being used to enhance aviation safety, benefiting the
flying public as a whole. VDPs, in turn, complement Safety Management Systems (SMS) that provide a systematic way for carriers and other operators to control risk, and to provide assurance
that those risk controls are effective. SMS programs are voluntary and are designed to be compatible with other voluntary programs such as ASAP and FOQA. The FAA has said it believes
that a closer more collaborative relationship with more sharing
of information will lead to a more effective, efficient management of both the FAA and operator safety responsibilities.""
Put more emphatically, with a limited number of FAA inspectors
and without the assistance of the industry, the FAA cannot possibly obtain the safety data it needs to accomplish its statutory
mandate for "assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and
security as the highest priorities in air commerce."" It is imperative, therefore, to protect voluntarily disclosed data from improper use in civil litigation, and it is equally important to
64 See 14 C.F.R. Part 193 (2009) (addressing FAA protection of safety and security information).
65 Elwyn Jordan, Fed. Aviation Admin., Introduction to Safety Management
Systems (SMS), Apr. 19-19, 2007, http://www.faa.gov/search/?q=Introduction+
to+Safety+Management+Systems+April+18 (select "Intro to Safety Mgmt Systems
(SMS)" Powerpoint presentation).
6 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (1) (2006).
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protect the confidentiality of the source of such data. Without
these two protections, air carriers will view ASAP as a liability to
their operations, employees will lose faith in the program, and
the flying public will be put at risk. In order to combat these
unnecessary results, and in the light of the Lexington decision, it
is necessary to seek a federal statute protecting voluntarily disclosed safety information.
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